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In 1996, free market Republicans and budget-cutting
Democrats offered farmers a deal: accept a cut in farm subsidies
and, in return, the government would promote exports in new
trade deals with Latin America and in the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and would eliminate restrictions on
planting decisions.1 In economic terms, farmers were asked to
take on risks heretofore assumed by the government in
exchange for deregulation and the promise of increased exports. 2
This sounded like a good deal to many farmers, especially
since exports and prices had been rising for several years. Many
farmers and agribusiness interests supported the bill, and it was
in keeping with the position of many farmer representatives and
most members of Congress from farm states who already
supported the WTO, the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the extension of fast-track trade negotiating
authority, usually in the name of supporting family farmers.
* Economist, Economic Policy Institute. The author would like to thank
Yonatan Alemu and Nicholas Trebat for research assistance and Eileen
Appelbaum and Jeff Faux for comments on an earlier draft.
1. See John Carey, Commentary: Let the Markets Do Their Job, BusuNEss
WEEK, June 28, 1999, at 33.
2. See Jon Lauck, Against the Grain: The North Dakota Wheat Pooling
Plan and the Liberalization Trend in World Agricultural Markets, 8 MIN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 289, 293-313 (1999) (providing a succinct description of
government intervention in world agricultural markets in the twentieth
century).
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But for family farmers, the Omnibus Farm Bill-and the
export-led growth strategy upon which it was based-has been a
massive failure. The U.S. farm trade balance declined by nearly
$12 billion between 1996 and 1998, and prices have plummet-
ed.3 August U.S. corn prices fell from $4.30 per bushel in 1996 to
$1.89 in 1998, or 56 percent. Wheat prices fell from $4.57 per
bushel in 1996 to $2.46 in 1998, or 46 percent.4
TABLE 1. CHANGES IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
WORKING FARMS, 1993-1998
Size Class: Annual Sales
$1,000,000 $500,000- $250,000- $100,000- $50,000-
or more $999,999 $499,999 $249,999 $99,999 total
Number
1993 15,829 32,628 75,008 237,574 224,584 585,623
1997 19,967 36,986 88,288 220,293 199,836 565,369
Percent
change 26.1% 13.4% 17.7% -7.3% -11% -3.5%
Number
gained or lost 4,138 4,358 13,280 -17,281 -24,748 -20,254
Number lost
with gross
incomes of
$50,000 to
$250,000 -42,029
Source: Access site: http://www.econ.ag.gov/Briefing/fbe/fi/fiscdmu.htm. Select
years 1993 and 1997 to retrieve data.
The combination of export dependence and deregulation has
left increased numbers of family farmers facing extinction. 5 At
the same time, U.S. agriculture becomes more centralized in the
hands of large farms and national and multinational compa-
nies.6 Contrary to the Department of Agriculture's rosy predic-
tions, the plight of farmers is likely to get worse under current
3. See U.S. Department of Commerce, Table 20. U.S. Total Agricultural
Trade Balances with Individual Countries (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
4. See USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural Prices
Monthly (visited Oct. 10, 1999); Joint Economic Committee and Council on
Economic Advisors, U.S. Congress, 1998 and 1999, Economic Indicators (visited
Sept. 26, 1999) (indicating the seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index (CPI)
for monthly price deflators).
5. See supra Table 1 (for data on recent declines in the number of small
farms in the U.S).
6. See id.
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policies.7 Expanding supplies are likely to outpace the growth in
demand for U.S. farm products; restricted access to foreign mar-
kets will continue; and the strong dollar, actively supported by
the U.S. Treasury, will further depress the prices farmers re-
ceive for their goods.8
It is time to end this cruel hoax on the American family
farmer. In the short-term, the U.S. government should stabilize
income and reduce excess supplies. This could be achieved by:
(1) reducing the value of the dollar in order to boost farm prices;
(2) shifting subsidies away from large farms and corporate farm-
ers to small farms; (3) a renewal of set-aside and other land-
conservation programs. For the long-term, the U.S should es-
tablish regulatory mechanisms to restore supply-demand bal-
ance and accelerate shifts to high-value products. These goals
could be accomplished by: (1) increasing expenditures for re-
search, development, and infrastructure; (2) supporting new
uses for farm products.
I. FREEDOM TO FAIL: THE OMNIBUS 1996 FARM BILL
For more than a half-century after the Great Depression,
government policies helped create a highly successful U.S. agri-
cultural sector by reducing risks to family farmers. 9 Crop insur-
ance reduced production risk, and a variety of price and income
support programs, plus set-aside programs that paid farmers to
remove excess land from production, reduced price risks. But the
Omnibus 1996 Farm Bill eliminated price and income supports
and replaced them with annual income payments, to be phased
out over seven years on a fixed declining schedule. 10 The 1996
farm bill also eliminated the set-aside program, thus giving
farmers, in the words of one commentator, "the freedom to plant
what they wanted, when they wanted. With prices rising and
global demand soaring, lawmakers and farmers were happy to
exchange the bureaucratic rulebook for the Invisible Hand.""
7. See Daryll E. Ray, Overview of Agriculture Today and In the Future,
Address at the University of Tennessee Milan No-Till Field Day (July 22, 1999)
(arguing that the reduction of government price and income supports coupled
with the destabilizing effects of international trade will continue to suppress
agricultural prices into the next century).
8. See id.
9. See Ralph M. Chite and Mark Jickling, Managing Farm Risk in a New
Policy Era, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS 97-572 at
2 (last modified Jan. 22, 1999).
10. See id.
11. See Carey, supra note 1, at 33.
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The rapid growth in U.S. agricultural exports-more than
doubling between 1985 and 1996-encouraged farmers to accept
the deregulation strategy.12 But rising exports have not trans-
lated into rising incomes. Due to globalization and relentless de-
clines in the real prices of basic farm products, the structure of
American agriculture has been transformed, and, as a result,
real U.S. farm income has been steady or declining for many
years despite the long-run trend of rising exports. 13
In the two decades from 1978 to 1997, real grain prices were
slashed in half. Then, in 1998, prices fell an additional 10-20
percent, pushing many small farmers to the brink of bank-
ruptcy.1 4 In this environment, only the largest and most capital
intensive farms are able to survive and prosper.' 5
There are about 2 million farms in the U.S., but three-
quarters of those generate minimal or negative net incomes. 16
Since farms with less that $50,000 in gross revenues tend to be
primarily part-time or recreational ventures, this section ana-
lyzes working farms that generate gross revenues in excess of
$50,000 per year.
12. See US Department of Agriculture, Table 1. U.S. International Trade
In Goods and Services Balance of Payments Basis (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/industry/otea/usfth/aggregateH98tO1.txt>.
13. See DARYLL E. RAY, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF AGRICULTURE: RHET-
ORIC vERsus REAUTY(1988). With rising excess capacity and declining farm
prices, an increase in export revenues will not offset lower export prices. This,
Ray argues, helps explain the downward trend in farm incomes. In general, the
demand for agricultural products is price-inelastic. In other words, the percent-
age response in total quantity of agricultural goods demanded tends to be much
less than a given percentage reduction in price. Id. See also U.S. Dep't of Agric.,
Agricultural Income and Finance Situation and Outlook (visited Sept. 23, 1999)
<http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/reports/erssor/economics/ais-bb/1998/
agricultural income and finance_12.18.98>.
14. Real corn prices declined from $5.28 per bushel in 1978 to $2.65 in
1997, then to $2.36 in 1998. Real wheat prices declined from $7.08 per bushel in
1978 to $3.87 in 1997, then to $3.01 in 1998. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Prices
Rec'd by Farmers: Historic Prices & Indexes 1908-1992 (92152) (visited Sept. 23,
1999) <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/crops/95152/.>; USDA Na-
tional Agricultural Statistics Service, Agricultural Prices Monthly (visited
Sept. 24, 1999. These numbers were converted to real prices using the CPI-
UX1 deflator. See Joint Economic Committee and Council on Economic, U.S.
Congress, 1998 and 1999, Economic Indicators at Table 23. Simple annual
averages of monthly real prices were used to compute annual average revenues,
in real terms.
15. See Ray, supra note 13, at (i) (With reference to the 1985 Food Security
Act, Ray notes that agribusiness "enthusiastically embraced" the government's
adoption of export-oriented agricultural policies).
16. See supra Table 1.
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Within this group, the number of large farms is growing
while small farms are disappearing at a rapid pace, as shown in
TABLE 1. There were 554,000 working farms in the U.S. in
1993.17 More than 42,000 farms with revenues of less than
$250,000 per year disappeared between 1994 and 1997, a de-
cline of about 10 percent. Nearly 20,000 farms with revenues in
excess of $250,000 per year were added in this three-year period,
an increase of about 17 percent. Thus, the U.S. experienced a
net loss of about 22,000 farms between 1994 and 1997 alone.' 8
Corporate influence is growing throughout the U.S. food
supply system.' 9 While the share of farms owned by individuals
and families (operating as sole proprietors) was roughly con-
stant between 1978 and 1992, at about 85 percent of all farms,
the output share of such farms declined during this period from
about 62 percent to 54 percent. 20 Corporations absorbed most of
this production lost by sole proprietors between 1978 and 1992.
Moreover, an increasing number of family farmers are raising
crops under contract from big purchasers. 2'
Corporate control is becoming much more concentrated both
upstream and downstream from farmers. 22 On the input side,
considerable consolidation is taking place among firms that sup-
ply farmers with seeds and chemical inputs. A small number of
companies are assuming control of the seed production business,
including Monsanto, Dupont, and Novartis. 23 The story is simi-
lar on the distributional side. Grain distribution, for example,
which has been tightly controlled by a handful of companies
since the 19th century, is becoming even more concentrated. 24
Recently, Cargill has proposed to purchase Continental's grain
17. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., A Close-up Of Changes in Farm Organization
(visited Oct. 14, 1999) <http://www.econ.ag.gov/briefing/FarmStructure/qa/
Text.closeup.html>.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See Richard A. Melcher and John Carey, More bitter harvests ahead:
trouble abroad and at home are squeezing family farms, BusiNEss WEEK, June
28, 1999 at 32-3. See also Robert Scott, The U.S. Trade Deficit: Are We Trading
Away Our Future? Testimony given before the Subcommittee on International
Economic Policy and Trade of the House Committee on International Relations
(July 22, 1999) (analyzing "The Corporate Role in Globalization," which has ad-
versely affected the U.S. economy as a whole).
22. See Melcher and Carey, supra note 21, at 32.
23. See id.
24. See id.
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storage unit, which would result in a single firm that would con-
trol more than one-third of U.S. grain exports.25
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE SIREN'S SONG
The growth in agricultural exports, especially in the first
half of 1990s, suggested to small farmers that sales to foreign
markets were the key to solving their problems.26 However, ex-
port markets have proven to be more volatile than domestic
ones, and globalization has increased the vulnerability of farm-
ers to sudden price swings.27
The U.S. agricultural trade balance with the rest of the
world increased by almost $11 billion between 1990 and 1996
(TABLE 2), then declined by nearly $12 billion between 1996 and
1998.28 This drop in the volume of net exports, which was equal
TABLE 2. U.S. TRADE BALANCE WITH INDIVIDUAL
COUNTRIES, 1990-98 ($ MILLIONS)*
Changes:
Country/Region 1990 1996 1998* 1990 to 1996 1996 to 1998
WORLD 17,292 27,994 16,264 10,702 -13,238
EUROPE 5,228 4,835 2,199 -393 -4,229
Canada 1,587 133 42 -1,454 -914
Mexico -98 1,654 1,516 1,752 -182
NAFTA 1,488 1,787 1,558 299 -1,096
ASIA 14,147 22,249 14,737 8,102 -7,594
REST OF THE
WORLD -3,572 -877 -3,788 2,695 -319
*Census Basis; Foreign and Domestic Exports, F.a.s.
**Estimated-incomplete data for all countries.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Foreign Trade Highlights (http://
www.ita.doc.gov/cgi-bin/otea-ctr?task=r) and U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the U.S. (http:/www.
econ.ag.gov /db /F).
25. See id. See Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian Antitrust: A New Direction
for Agricultural Law, 75 N.D.L. REv. 449 (urging courts to reject agribusiness
mergers such as Cargill-Continental).
26. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Total Value of U.S. Agricultural Trade-histor-
ical series 1935-present (visited Sept. 26, 1999) <http://www.econ.ag.gov/brief-
ing/AgTrade/#Data>.
27. See USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service, supra note 4, at
1996-1998.
28. See U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 3, at Table 20.
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to a 6% decline in farm revenues, was compounded by a sharp
decline in domestic commodity prices (discussed below).29 These
two factors combined in 1997 and 1998 to severely depress farm
incomes.
Closer examination of regional trends in U.S. farm trade
shows that only a limited number of markets were open to U.S.
farm products. The U.S. trade balance with Europe declined
sharply between 1990 and 1998, as shown in Table 2.30 During
that time exports to Europe fell by about $2 billion while U.S.
imports increased by $3 billion.31 U.S. trade problems with Eu-
rope result from continued high subsidies to European farms
and European resistance to certain U.S. farm products, such as
hormone-treated beef.3 2 The Uruguay Round trade agreements
were designed, in part, to reduce agricultural subsidies, but Eu-
ropean farm spending actually increased from $46.0 billion in
1995 (the year before the agreements went into effect) to $55
billion in 1997.3 3 During the same period, U.S. government pay-
ments to farmers held steady at $7 billion, less than 13% of the
European level. 34
Under NAFTA and the earlier U.S.-Canada Free Trade
Agreement (which went into effect in 1989), the volume of farm
trade has significantly increased throughout the region.35 How-
ever, the net result has been a small but significant decline in
the U.S. farm trade surplus with Mexico and Canada,3 6 contra-
29. See U.S. Dep't of Agric., Farm Cash Receipts Data homepage (visited
Sept. 23, 1999). See also U.S. Dep't of Agric., Agricultural Income and Finance
Situation and Outlook (visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/
reports/erssor/economics/ais-bb/1998/agricul-
turalincomeand finance_12.18.98.> (indicating 1998 estimates).
30. U.S. Department of Commerce, "U.S. Foreign Trade Highlights," supra
note 3, at Table 20.
31. See id.
32. See Lawrence Speer, Anti-American, Anti-Global Forces Unite In Back-
lash Against Tariffs on French Foods, 172 DAILY REPORT FOR ExEcUTrvES A-6
(1999).
33. See USDA, Mann Library Homepage, European Agricultural Statistics
(98001)(Table sb13) (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http'J/usda.mannlib.cormell.edu/
data-sets/international/98001>.
34. See USDA, Mann Library Homepage, Government Payments Data (vis-
ited Oct. 8, 1999) <http'J/usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/re... ncome-andfinance_
summary>.
35. See U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 3, at Tables 18-19.
(Note that volume is defined as sum of exports plus imports).
36. See id. at Table 20.
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dicting the U.S. Trade Representative's statement that "NAFTA
has been a tremendous success for American agriculture."37
NAFTA has also resulted in a massive shift in the structure
of trade and production within North America. U.S. exports of
corn and other feed grains (such as sorghum) have increased,
but U.S. imports of fruits, vegetables, wheat, barley, and cattle
have all increased much more.38 For example, U.S. grain exports
to Canada (primarily corn and other feed grains) increased by
127% between 1990 and 1998, but at the same time U.S. imports
of wheat from Canada increased by 249%, from $79 million in
1990 to $278 million in 1998.39 Similarly, U.S. corn exports to
Mexico increased by 47% during that period, while cattle and
calf imports from Mexico soared by 1,280%.4 0
Since the trade balance with Europe and North America
was relatively flat from 1990 to 1996, what was the source of
strongly growing demand for U.S. farm products in the 1990s?
Answer: the trade balance with Asia increased by $8 billion (Ta-
ble 2).41 Unfortunately for U.S. farmers, though, the demand
that pulled in U.S. farm exports to Asia was driven by the same
inflationary bubble that ultimately caused the world financial
crisis. An unprecedented inflow of short-term capital into Asia
stimulated a huge growth in consumption. When this capital
flowed out even more quickly in the wake of the Thai financial
crisis in July 1997, the U.S. agricultural trade balance with Asia
collapsed back to its 1990 level. 4 2
Thus, the boom in U.S. agriculture in the early 1990s, which
convinced farmers that trade liberalization was the solution to
their problems, was built on the false foundation of a speculative
bubble. Increased trade has certainly increased the volatility of
farm incomes, but it has yet to improve their average level.
37. JOHN HUENNEMANN, DEPUTY U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE FOR NORTH
AMERICAN AFFAIRS, REMARKS FROM A SEMINAR ON "GOVERNING IN THE GLOBAL
AGE," WASHINGTON, D.C., GEORGE WASHINGTON U., (June 18, 1998). See also
ROBERT E. SCOTT ET AL., TRADING AWAY GOOD JOBS: AN EXAMINATION OF EM-
PLOYMENT AND WAGES IN THE U.S., 1979-1994 (indicating many free-traders cite
only the job and growth possibilities created by exports, while ignoring the job
loss created by increased imports.
38. See USDA, Mann Library Homepage, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the
United States (FATUS) (visited Oct. 8, 1999).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. U.S. Department of Commerce, supra note 3, at Table 20.
42. See ROBERT A. BLECKER, TAMING GLOBAL FINANCE: A BETTER ARCHITEC-
TURE FOR GROWTH AND EQUITY, (Economic Policy Institute, 1999) (analyzing the
causes of the Asian financial crisis). See also U.S. Department of Commerce,
supra note 3, at Table 2 and Table 20.
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Globalization has also stacked the deck against family farmers,
since they tend to be under-capitalized and more vulnerable to
financial cycles in comparison to large and diversified corporate
farms.43
The U.S. Department of Agriculture has fueled expectations
that the global demand for U.S. agricultural products will in-
crease in the future. Its most recent baseline forecasts predicts
that commodity prices, net farm income, and U.S. exports will
all recover rapidly in 2000 and climb steadily thereafter.4 The
USDA has also forecast that U.S. agriculture would benefit from
further trade liberalization. For example, it estimated that the
proposed Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) "would
cause annual U.S. farm income (in 1992 dollars) to be $180 mil-
lion higher than it otherwise would be."4 5
This forecast is particularly surprising because the same re-
port also predicts that the FTAA will reduce the U.S. trade bal-
ance. 46 Specifically, it predicts that the FTAA will have a larger
impact on U.S. farm imports than on exports, thus increasing
the current U.S. agricultural trade deficit with Latin America.47
The reported income effects include only efficiency gains from
the shift of resources from one crop to another, and exclude the
losses from declining demand for U.S. farm products and from
rising imports resulting from deregulated trade.48 The report
does acknowledge that the reported gains "are very small
changes in U.S. farm income"49 and that:
The short-run adjustment costs for some farm households could be
large. Hence, the debate on the acceptability of an FTAA may hinge on
43. See Ray, supra note 7.
44. See USDA, USDA baseline presentation (visited Oct. 8, 1999) (Intro-
duction, Contents and Overview at 2, U.S. Crop Highlights at 4 and 7, and Farm
Income and Financial Conditions at 2).
45. See USDA, Mann Library Homepage, Terri Raney et al, Free Trade in
the Americas: International Agriculture and Trade, (Nov. 1998) wrs984s.asc>.
46. See id. at 1-2 (estimating that U.S. exports would be "$580 million
higher (lpercent) and imports $830 million higher (3 percent)," thus decreasing
the U.S. agricultural trade balance).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 37. See also DARYLL E. RAY & Roy FREDRICK, FOOD, AGRICUL-
TURE, AND RURAL POLICY INTO THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY: IssuEs AND TRADE-
OFFs (THE ECONOMIC SETTING FOR U.S. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE) (Milton C.
Hallberg et al., eds., Westview Press) (indicating the relatively "fixed nature of
agricultural resources," the inability of many farmers to "quickly move re-
sources out of and into agricultural production," casts further doubt upon the
'efficiency" claims espoused by the USDA).
49. See Raney, supra note 45, at 2.
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its distributional consequences rather than on the gains to the entire
economy or to the agricultural sector as a whole.
50
The FTAA report further assumes that the economy will be
at full employment and that there are no adjustment costs due
to changes in trade.51 Moreover, as the authors note, the im-
pacts of agricultural trade deficits and structural change on the
farm sector are excluded from the study.
Similar predictions were made about the benefits of NAFTA
and the Uruguay Round trade agreements that created the
WTO. 52 U.S. farmers were supposed to benefit because they are
the world's low-cost producers of many types of grain and live-
stock. As we have seen, it did not turn out that way. Are the
USDA's predictions that rising exports will cause farm prices to
increase in the future likely to be any more accurate now? An
economic analysis (see the Appendix for methodological details)
of the various forces that influence U.S. commodity prices -
namely, (1) U.S. income (in terms of gross domestic product, or
GDP), (2) the real (inflation adjusted) U.S. exchange rate, and
(3) worldwide average crop yields (which reflect the influence of
technology on crop supplies) - shows that U.S. farm prices are
unlikely to rise in the future unless U.S. agricultural policies are
substantially revised.53
Data from the corn and wheat sector indicate that the U.S.
income has a small effect on price. 54 Similiarly, the changes in
U.S. income associated with the Asian crisis have not reduced
grain prices, but this result is not strong, statistically
speaking.55
50. Id. at 38.
51. Id. at 37.
52. See Thea Lee, False Prophets: The Selling of NAFTA, Briefing paper
(Washington, D.C., Economic Policy Institute, July 1995).
53. See Ray, supra note 13 (Generally speaking, agriculture cannot raise
itself "by its own bootstraps." Reduced prices alone do not engender significant
modifications in worldwide export demand). See also Ray, supra note 7 (for ex-
tended agricultural price forecasts).
54. The analysis in the remainder of this section summarized the results of
the economic model which is described and estimated in the Appendix. See
supra Appendix, Table Al, and Table A2.
55. The coefficients in the Appendix measure the effects of a percentage
change in the variable listed on corn and wheat prices. Thus, for example, the
positive coefficient for real U.S. GDP in the corn price regression suggests that
a 1% decline in U.S. income would reduce corn prices by 2%. Since U.S. income
was not reduced by the Asian crisis in 1997 or 1998, this factor does not explain
the decline in U.S. grain prices in this period.
[Vol. 9:87
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Exchange rates, on the other hand, have large and statisti-
cally significant effects on farm prices. 56 Each one percent in-
crease in the value of the dollar generates a 1.1 percent decline
in the price of corn and a 1.5 percent decline in the price of
wheat. Thus, the 16 percent appreciation in the value of the U.S.
dollar that occurred between 1995 and 1997 is responsible for 17
to 24 percentage points of the decline in U.S. corn and wheat
prices, respectively. 57 World commodity yields also have a large
and significant effect on prices.58 As yields per acre rise, prices
fall. The expansion in world supplies of each commodity de-
presses its price. While the growth in income has only a weak
effect on prices, technology and the growth in world agricultural
productivity has a strong, negative impact on prices over time. 59
These results show why farmers have been misled about the
benefits of trade liberalization. Previous rounds of trade negotia-
tions have failed to generate sustained, reliable growth in de-
mand for U.S. farm products. In addition, the diffusion of
advanced agricultural technologies (the "green revolution")
around the globe has had a depressing effect on U.S. farm prices
because it increased global crop yields. This price depression has
occurred despite, or perhaps because of, the benefits that ad-
vance technologies have generated for farmers and consumers
throughout the developing world.
III. TIME FOR A NEW FARM POLICY
There is nothing wrong with expanding trade in agriculture
as long as it can be accomplished in ways that benefit U.S. farm-
ers. However, because the U.S. government is unwilling to ad-
dress such fundamental problems as global excess crop supplies
and rising currency values, pushing for more free trade in agri-
culture is counterproductive. It is time to stop artificially ex-
panding trade without regard for the consequences.
The Omnibus 1996 Farm Bill was a complete failure. It
failed to generate export-led growth, and it transferred substan-
tial risks to farmers with no visible benefits. Given the diffusion
of technology to the rest of the world, and because other coun-
56. See supra note 54.
57. See id. The model developed in the Appendix uses commodity-specific
export price indices for corn and wheat that are developed by the USDA. The
negative sign on the coefficient reported in the Appendix shows that an increase
in the value of the dollar has a depressing effect on corn and wheat prices.
58. See id.
59. See id. The effect of yields is statistically significant at the 0.0001 level
for corn, but it is not significant for wheat.
20001
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tries seek to maintain their own food security, agriculture will
never be a substantial growth industry for the U.S. However,
for the same reason, the U.S. needs a viable farm sector, one
that can deliver a high and rising standard of living for family
farmers and consumers.
In the short-term, the U.S. government should stabilize
farm incomes and reduce excess supplies. This could be achieved
by: (1) Carefully managed reductions in the value of the dollar;
(2) The shift of agricultural subsidies away from large farms and
corporate farmers to small farms; (3) a renewal of set-aside and
other land-conservation programs. For the long-term, the U.S
should establish regulatory mechanisms to restore supply-de-
mand balance and accelerate shifts to high-value products.
These goals could be accomplished by: (1) An increase in expend-
itures for research and development, and the construction of in-
frastructure and distribution systems for new, higher-valued
products that can be produced with sustainable (e.g., organic)
technologies and that meet consumer demand for high-quality,
niche, and specialty foods; (2) The exploration of other possibili-
ties for stimulating agricultural consumption (such as the con-
version of biomass to energy) to build domestic demand for
agricultural products.
[Vol. 9:87
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APPENDIX
THE CAUSES OF FALLING COMMODITY PRICES
This section develops a reduced form analysis of the causes of
variation in real corn and wheat prices in the United States be-
tween 1972 and 1997. It assumes that the market is competi-
tively structured. Demand and supply in each market are
specified as follows (using the corn market as an example), in
functional form:
corn demand = f(corn prices, real U.S. GDP, real exchange rate),
corn supply = g(corn prices, world corn yields, real oil prices).
Equating supply and demand, and solving for corn prices, yields
a reduced form model for the equilibrium price of corn:
corn prices = h(real U.S. GDP, real exchange rate, world corn yields,
real oil prices)60
Data
This equation is estimated for corn and wheat prices using an-
nual data, in log-first differences form, in order to control for se-
rial correlation in the errors.6 1 Real GDP in the U.S. is used as
a proxy for the broader effects of income on demand.62 Exchange
rates use commodity specific weights developed by the USDA.6 3
Export market weights are used for the corn exchange rate be-
cause half of all U.S. corn supplies are exported. Import weights
are used for the wheat exchange rate because wheat imports
have gained in importance, particularly since the implementa-
tion of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement in 1989. A one
period lag is used on the exchange rate to capture the full long-
run impact of exchange rates on prices. Average world yields per
hectare are as reported by the World Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization for each commodity. 64 Real oil prices are used as a
60. See Robert E. Scott & Robert A. Blecker, Labour rents, adjustment
costs, and the cost of U.S. steel trade restraints in the 1980s, 11 Int'l Rev. of
Applied Economics 399, 399-419 (1997) (giving a more detailed exposition of a
similar market structure).
61. See USDA, Prices Rec'd by Farmers: Historic Prices & Indexes, and Ag-
ricultural Prices- Annual, supra note 15. See also Economic Indicators, supra
note 4, at Table 23.
62. See Economic Indicators, supra note 4, at Table 2.
63. See USDA, Agricultural Based Exchange Rates (88021) (visited Oct. 8,
1999) <http://usda2.mannlibb.cornell.edul/. . .ets/international/8802 1/
README.TXT>.
64. See FAOSTAT, Agricultural Data, World Yields (visited Oct. 8. 1999).
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proxy for the impact of all energy prices on the costs (and sup-
ply) of agricultural products. 65
Results
The equations were estimated using ordinary least squares. Re-
sults for the corn equation (TABLE Al) show that corn yields
have a strong negative effect on corn prices, as expected. Since
corn yields have increased by about 50% in the study period, this
variable explains most of the long-run decline in real corn prices
between 1972 and 1997. The coefficient for corn yields is signifi-
cantly different from 0 at the 0.0001 level.
The exchange rate also has a negative sign and is signifi-
cant at the .05 level. Since the equations are estimated in log-
difference form, the coefficients can be interpreted as giving the
percent change in prices for each 1% change in the independent
variable. Thus, a 1% appreciation of the dollar would reduce
corn prices by 1.095% within one year, according to the results
in Table Al.
TABLE Al.
US CORN PRICES
Dependent Variable: US Corn Prices (Real)
Method: Least Squares on Log First Differences
Sample (adjusted): 1972 1997
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant -0.073909 0.051363 -1.438955 0.1649
World Corn Yields -1.792539 0.375427 -4.774663 0.0001
Exchange Rate Corn(-1)) -1.095672 0.504607 -2.171334 0.0415
Real US GDP 2.201256 1.481215 1.486115 0.1521
Real Oil Prices 0.183161 0.143716 1.274459 0.2164
R-squared 0.563241
Adjusted R-squared 0.480049
F-statistic 6.770370
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001154
Log likelihood 13.93022
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.442770
None of the other coefficients in Table Al are significant at
the .10 level, as shown there. However, real GDP has the ex-
pected positive sign. The coefficient estimate suggests that a 1%
increase in GDP would increase corn prices by about 2.2%. Over-
65. See U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., Historical Data
and Analysis Homepage (visited Oct. 8, 1999).
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all, this equation explains over half of the variation in U.S. corn
prices in this period. The whole equation is significant at the
.001 level, as indicated by the f statistic.
Results for the wheat equation (TABLE A2) show that wheat
yields have a strong, negative effect on wheat prices, as ex-
pected. However, the coefficient on wheat yields is not signifi-
cant. The exchange rate also has a negative sign, and is
significant at the. 10 level. A 1% appreciation of the dollar would
reduce wheat prices by 1.50% within one year, according to the
results in Table A2.
TABLE A2.
US WHEAT PRICES
Dependent Variable: US Wheat Prices (Real)
Method: Least Squares on Log First Differences
Sample (adjusted): 1972 1997
Included observations: 26 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
Constant -0.111280 0.073772 -1.508428 0.1463
World Wheat Yields -0.356295 0.964636 -0.369357 0.7156
Exchange Rate Wheat(-1) -1.500124 0.802243 -1.869914 0.0755
Real US GDP 3.300456 2.172691 1.519064 0.1437
Real Oil Prices -0.123811 0.212935 -0.581453 0.5671
R-squared 0.242674
Adjusted R-squared 0.098421
F-statistic 1.682285
Prob (F-statistic) 0.191630
Log likelihood 4.478358
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.557117
None of the other coefficients in Table A2 are significant at
the 0.10 level, as shown there. However, real GDP once again
has the expected positive sign. The coefficient estimate suggests
that a 1% percent increase in GDP would increase wheat prices
by about 3.3%.
Overall, the results for this equation are less satisfactory
than for corn. Less than one-quarter of the variation in U.S.
wheat prices in this period is explained in this analysis. The
whole equation is insignificant at the 0.10 level, as indicated by
the F statistic, although the coefficient for the exchange rate it-
self is weakly significant. These results suggest that there are
variables missing from the wheat model. A likely candidate is
the implementation of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement.
U.S. wheat imports surged after 1990, as noted above, and U.S.
farmers have complained frequently about unfair trade prac-
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tices, including price manipulation by the Canadian Wheat
Board and currency manipulation by the Canadian Treasury.
These are important issues for future research.
